“The peculiarity of Daniel Dennett’s book can now be stated: he denies the existence of the data. He thinks there are no such things as the second sort of entity, the feeling of pain. He thinks there are no such things as qualia, subjective experiences, first-person phenomena, or any of the rest of it. Dennett agrees that it seems to us that there are such things as qualia, but this is a matter of a mistaken judgment we are making about what really happens. Well, what does really happen according to him?”
John R. Searle
including exchanges with Daniel C. Dennett and David J. Chalmers
A: I am glad to find there was nothing in the accounts I heard of you.
B: Pray, what were those?
A: You were represented in last night’s conversation, as one who maintained the most extravagant opinions that ever entered into the mind of man, to wit, not only that there is no such thing as Universal Grammar, but also that there is no such thing as qualia. 😀